Comments on: Iranian Traffic Engineering

By: How Nokia helped Iran “persecute and arrest” dissidents | Planet-Iran.com

Fri, 05 Mar 2010 23:39:24 +0000

[...] organizing tools in the days after the disputed election (the Iranian Internet was essentially cut off completely from the world right after the election, and only restored piecemeal as new blocking capabilities were brought [...]

By: …My heart’s in Accra » links for 2009-09-02

…My heart’s in Accra » links for 2009-09-02 — Wed, 02 Sep 2009 16:05:56 +0000

[...] Iranian Traffic Engineering Security to the Core | Arbor Networks Security Arbor sees Iranian networks return after June 13 outage (tags: iran elections network internet censorship) [...]

By: Jonathan Stone

Jonathan Stone — Sun, 09 Aug 2009 01:35:26 +0000

What kind of appliances would they be buying to do this IP traffic filtering? I have heard of the Nokia-Seimens monitoring that everyone is making a stink about, but you suggest here that there is something far less powerful being used. Would you feel comfortable giving some examples?

By: Iran Election Live-Blogging (Thursday June 18) | linkthe.com

Iran Election Live-Blogging (Thursday June 18) | linkthe.com — Thu, 30 Jul 2009 17:47:15 +0000

[...] Internet stopped.” Via reader Chas, on the Arbor Network Security blog, Craig Labovitz writes: In normal times, DCI carries roughly 5 Gbps of traffic (with a reported capacity of 12 Gbps) [...]

By: Annotated Bibliography: Twitter and the Iranian Election Protests « OPEN ANTHROPOLOGY

Fri, 24 Jul 2009 05:17:11 +0000

[...] Iranian Traffic Engineering Arbor Networks, Craig Labovitz, 17 June 2009 http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2009/06/iranian-traffic-engineering/ How could anyone in Iran have been tweeting on the days following the election when physical Internet traffic had been shut down? – Extract: “In normal times, DCI carries roughly 5 Gbps of traffic (with a reported capacity of 12 Gbps) through 6 upstream regional and global Internet providers. For the region, this represents an average level of Internet infrastructure (for purposes of perspective, a mid size ISP in Michigan carries roughly the same level of traffic). Then the Iranian Internet stopped. One the day after the elections on June 13th at 1:30pm GMT (9:30am EDT and 6:00pm Tehran / IRDT), Iran dropped off the Internet. All six regional and global providers connecting Iran to the rest of the world saw a near complete loss of traffic.” [...]

By: روش هاي ارتباطي از اين پس « تارتنک- آي‌تي‌2ميم‌ت

روش هاي ارتباطي از اين پس « تارتنک- آي‌تي‌2ميم‌ت — Sun, 05 Jul 2009 05:06:43 +0000

[...] اينكه در اين پست و نمودار آن، نشان داده شده كه به جهت محدوديت فني [...]

By: petro

petro — Wed, 01 Jul 2009 08:42:49 +0000

[...] analysis on the Iranian IT situation, picking their pet theories we presented late last night. – Arbor Networks thinks that the networks were taken offline and migrated to low-capacity proxy servers. – GigaOm’s [...]
interest iddei. i agreed

By: Traffic und Twitter im Iran | Webregard - Watch the Web

Traffic und Twitter im Iran | Webregard - Watch the Web — Tue, 30 Jun 2009 16:17:12 +0000

[...] gewinnen. Dies liegt an den aktuellen Ereignissen im Iran. Doch seit wenigen Wochen werden diese Dienste unterdrückt und sind nur noch durch Systeme wie Tor erreichbar. Verhaltenskodex bei Social [...]

By: Verdecchia Blog » Blog Archive » Un’occhiata al firewall dell’Iran

Mon, 29 Jun 2009 14:20:31 +0000

[...] http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2009/06/iranian-traffic-engineering/ [...]

By: National Traffic Engineering « CIP VIGILANCE

National Traffic Engineering « CIP VIGILANCE — Mon, 29 Jun 2009 14:05:43 +0000

[...] Iranian Traffic Engineering – A Deeper Look at The Iranian [...]